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I. Introduction
show proof of residence in Spain for a minimum of two years in order to be able to work or be self-employed with the same rights as nationals, or otherwise get a visa.
From 1 January 2009, Romanians and Bulgarians were finally free to enter, reside and work for wage and salary jobs in Spain, as with any other member of the Schengen zone.
Although it is not possible to disentangle the separate effects of the crisis and transitional arrangements for post-enlargement migration in Spain, this chapter investigates the labour market and welfare changes experienced by enlarged-EU migrants before and after 2007. For this purpose, Section 2 briefly reviews the Spanish socio-economic institutional background, as well as its migration policy towards enlarged-EU citizens. Section 3 discusses the importance of inflows and stocks of enlarged-EU migrants in Spain, including their socio-demographic, labour market and welfare use characteristics. Section 4 evaluates the impact of enlarged-EU migrants on the Spanish labour market and the welfare state, with particular attention paid to how the situation has changed for enlarged-EU migrants after 2007, in relation to other migrants and natives. After investigating the effects of enlarged-EU migrants on the native population, the paper concludes in Section 5 by discussing some lessons learned.
II. Spanish institutional background and migration policy towards enlarged-EU immigrants

Immigration in Spain
Spain has experienced a unique and unprecedented immigration boom in recent decades, with immigrant numbers increasing from 4 per cent of the population in 1990 to 14 per cent in 2011. At least four reasons explain this immigration boom. First, the booming Spanish economy and the social promotion of its national (especially female) population, in the form of increased education levels and higher labour force participation, generated a demand for foreign workers (Carrasco et al., 2008) . Second, its physical proximity to northern Africa and Eastern Europe places Spain close to countries that supply immigrants. Third, its shared language and historical pass with South Americans facilitates the social and cultural assimilation of immigrants from this continent. Finally, the government's weak control on immigrant inflows and several generous amnesties has de facto converted Spain into an immigrant friendly country (Dolado and Vázquez, 2007) .
Spanish immigration policy
Spain has not had an active policy of attracting immigrants. As early as 1985, it imposed severe restrictions on non-EU foreigners who wanted to establish Spanish residency and citizenship. 1 Further tightening took place from 1993 onwards, with tougher restrictions on work and residency permit renewals, as well as the implementation of an immigration quota system, limiting the entry of foreigners to around 30,000 per year. At the turn of the century, Spain updated its immigration legislation and assimilated it to that of other European countries.
However, the free entrance of foreigners as tourists, together with a lax implementation of immigration laws and several generous amnesties that have granted legal residence to illegal immigrants (1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, 2001 and 2005) , have converted Spain into an attractive destination for immigrants. In fact, the most common way of obtaining legal status in Spain during the past two decades has been through amnesties, often originally entering either illegally or as tourists (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2005 Rica, , 2008 Dolado and Vazquez, 2007; 1 To have the legal status, immigrants were required to acquire a work and residency permit that restricted them to a particular activity and geographic area only for a year. In addition, immigrants were not granted any social benefits, despite paying social security taxes when employed. 2 For instance, in the 2000 amnesty, immigrants had to provide proof of one of the following: (i) residence since 1 June 1999; (ii) having held a work permit any time during the three-year period preceding 1 February 2000; (iii) being denied asylum before February 2000; (iv) having applied for any type of residence permit before 30 March 2000; or (v) family ties to legal residents or to individuals in any of the previous categories. 1 January 2009, in addition to other requirements asked of non-EU citizens, such as a valid passport, no criminal record, private health insurance, documentation to justify the purpose of the trip (visiting friends, work or holiday), a return travel ticket and some financial guarantee (a minimum of € 600). As a result of these strict entry requirements, a substantial proportion of Romanians and Bulgarians entered the country legally through a temporary visa or permit, such as a tourist or family-visit visa, followed by an overstay, implying that their legal status in the country had expired. Indeed, Rodríguez-Planas and Vegas (2012) find that female Moroccans and Ecuadorians follow a similar assimilation pattern, which contrasts with that observed among Romanian women.
Legal framework for enlarged-EU migrants
While the former mainly come to Spain to work legally and (some of them) move out of employment over time, Romanians are considerably (and persistently) more attached to the labour force. Although they tend to lack legal status upon arrival, they gain this status over time. Owing to a generalized serious labour market disturbance after the 2008 Great Recession, the Spanish government decided to unilaterally suspend EU law on free movement for Romanian workers on 22 July 2011, and as required by the safeguard clause, subsequently requested the European Commission to state that EU law on free movement for Romanian workers should be suspended in Spanish territory. The Commission approved this request on 11 August 2011, authorising Spain to temporarily restrict access to its labour market for Romanian workers until 31 December 2012, due to the soaring unemployment rate and sluggish economic recovery. However, it is important to note that these restrictions do not apply to Romanian nationals who were already active in the Spanish labour market on that date, or those who were registered as jobseekers by the Public Employment Services in Spain at that time. In addition, Bulgarian and other enlarged-EU country workers also enjoy full rights to free movement in Spain, unlike Romanian workers.
By the end of 2012, Spain will not have to notify the Commission to continue to apply restrictions on labour market access of Romanian workers after 1 January 2012, given that the Commission authorisation to re-introduce restrictions under the safeguard clause following Spain's request is valid until 31 December 2013.
II. Scale and composition of enlarged-EU migrants in Spain
Inflows and stock 5 To analyse inflows and stocks of migrants in Spain we use the Spanish Local Population Registry, which has the advantage of including undocumented immigrants. As the Spanish welfare system offers free health care and education to all residents -including undocumented immigrants -it needs a population registry to keep a record of all individuals who can access this universal welfare. As a consequence, it is in immigrants' best interests to register in the Local Population Registry immediately after arriving in Spain. The registration process does not require proof of legal residence and guarantees full data confidentiality (i.e. the Spanish Government cannot use information in the Local Population Registry to deport undocumented immigrants). Moreover, in the case of an amnesty, the undocumented immigrants can show proof of residence and date of arrival in Spain -a necessary condition to be considered eligible for the amnesty -through their registration in the Local Population Registry. Finally, immigrants are required to update their status every two years, which guarantees the accuracy of the immigrant population in the Spanish Local Population Registry. 
Socio-demographic characteristics of enlarged-EU migrants
The Spanish LFS gathers information on demographic (age, years of education, marital status and region of residence) and employment characteristics (work status, occupation and industry), although unfortunately no information on earnings is available. For immigrants, defined as foreign-born workers who are not Spanish nationals, the LFS collects information on the number of years of residence in Spain, as well as the country of birth. Our analysis focuses on individuals between 16 and 64 years old, excluding older individuals to avoid complications involving retirement decisions. 6 One of the strengths of the LFS lies in its supposed inclusion of both legal and illegal immigrants, in contrast to alternative datasets that only cover legal ones, such as the data from the Social Security Records or the Wage Survey Structure. However, the potential under-reporting of illegal immigrants is likely, especially before an amnesty (as the LFS is voluntary, in contrast to the Census, which is mandatory). Similarly, return migration related (or not) to an amnesty may also warrant concern, given that both return migration and under-reporting of immigrants may generate deterministic biases in our analysis. However, studies suggest that amnesties should not be a major concern in our analysis (see Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007; Fernandez and Ortega, 2008; and Rodríguez-Planas, 2013 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for natives and immigrants, and also distinguishes migrants' region of origin. Focusing first on enlarged-EU migrants, we observe that 53 per cent are women. Moreover, as expected, enlarged-EU migrants are younger and more likely to have a high-school degree than the native population.
8 By contrast, enlarged-EU migrants are less likely to have a college degree than natives, and particularly males. While their household structure resembles that of natives in terms of average size, some interesting differences emerge. For instance, enlarged-EU migrants are less likely to be married and more likely to have children than natives (albeit fewer of them).
Most immigrants come to Spain to work, and enlarged-EU migrants are not any different in this respect, with almost 80 per cent of male and over 60 per cent of female migrants from EU-enlargement countries working in Spain. Of these immigrants, close to one-third work under a permanent contract, which guarantees them high severance pay if dismissed. Furthermore, a differential gender pattern emerges, whereby enlarged-EU female migrants are 14 percentage points more likely to work than their native counterparts. This higher labour force commitment implies that the share of those who work under a permanent contract is the same as native women (close to one third of those employed in a wage and salary job). By contrast, men do not exhibit a higher employment commitment, and the share of enlarged-EU male migrant workers with a permanent contract is two-thirds the size of that observed among natives, at 33 per cent. Perhaps surprisingly given their education level, enlarged-EU migrants are primarily employed in low-earning occupations, with as few as 5 per cent of male and 6 per cent of female enlarged-EU migrants working in medium-or high-earning occupations (as shown in Table 2 ). domestic sector is also the most common occupation among other female immigrants.
In contrast, while many women from other ethnic groups work in the sales sector (with a share of 6 per cent), the share of enlarged-EU female migrants in this sector is only 3 per cent, which is likely due to their lower language skills. Finally, both enlarged-EU and other female migrants are also prominently represented in the food-services sector (as waiters and cooks). In addition, both enlarged-EU and other migrants hold other unskilled jobs (such as janitors, drivers and warehouse workers), with over 25 of enlarged-EU migrants and 20 per cent of other migrants working in such types of jobs.
estate bubble burst in 2008 -than native men, they are more likely to have been hit harder by the great recession than natives, explaining their higher UI receipt.
Relative to other migrants, migrants from the EU enlargement member states are those who have most recently arrived in Spain. On average, they have been in Spain for close to 5 years, which is less than half the average length of African migrants. Indeed, this most likely explains the concentration of enlarged-EU migrants in low-earning occupations, relative to their African and South American counterparts.
IV. Enlarged-EU migrants' Labour market and welfare assimilation in
Spain
Empirical specification
This section examines the labour market and welfare assimilation of enlarged-EU migrants in Spain before and after the 2007 crisis. In particular, we analyse differences in observable characteristics between enlarged-EU migrants and natives, as well as enlarged-EU migrants and other migrants, and explain the observed descriptive differences from the previous section. Moreover, we study whether these differences changed after the 2007 crisis, estimating a cross-sectional linear probability model. The variable X ijt is a vector of person-specific characteristics that includes the following socio-demographic controls: age and age squared, marital status, four education dummies (primary education, secondary education but no high-school degree, highschool graduate and college education), household size, number of children in the household and four dummies indicating the age of the children in the household (0-4, 5-9, 10-15 and 16-29 years old). i indexes the individual, t the LFS year, and j indexes the country of origin. Enl_EU ijt is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is an assimilation is under analysis. For example, when we examine work assimilation, Y ijt is a dummy indicating whether the individual is working at the time of the survey. Other aspects analysed include dummies for: working under a permanent contract; being selfemployed; receiving cash-welfare benefits, such as UI benefits, retired pension and other types of pension, including disability pension, and only receiving UI benefits. Furthermore, in order to identify possible skill mismatches and over-qualification, we construct a variable that has the value 1 if the individual works in a low-earning occupation, 2 if in a middle-earning occupation, and 3 for a high-earning occupation, and is only estimated for individuals working at the time of the survey.
Tables 4 to 9 present the results from these regressions. Given our interest in analysing how enlarged-EU migrants compare to natives, equation (1) is estimated on a sample of enlarged-EU migrants and natives, with the results from these estimations 11 We cannot include housing, schooling or health-care benefits are these are not measured in the LFS. detailed in column (1) of Tables 4 to 9 . Column 2 repeats the analysis yet compares enlarged-EU migrants to other migrants living in Spain.
Our analysis focuses on the coefficients, α 2, and (α 2 +α 6 ), which capture male and female differences from 2000 to 2007 between enlarged-EU migrants and: (i) natives (in column 1); and (ii) other migrants living in Spain (in column 2), controlling for migrants' year of arrival in Spain. If lower employment-or welfare-participation rates among immigrants are simply due to differences in observable characteristics between enlarged-EU and other migrants, the coefficients α 2 and (α 2 +α 6 ) should not be significantly different from zero when these controls are included in the model. The coefficients (α 2 +α 4 ) and (α 2 +α 4 +α 6 ) measure the male and female differences between enlarged-EU migrants and natives (in column 1) or other migrants (in column 2) after 
Labour market and welfare between 2000 and 2007
Below we summarize the main results from Tables 4 to 9. We first focus on the period pre-2008, before Section 4.3 investigates the differential effects after 2007.
Compared to natives, enlarged-EU male migrants are less likely to work upon arrival.
By contrast, enlarged-EU female migrants are slightly more likely to work upon arrival than their native counterparts. Estimates from column 1 in Table 4 show that, upon arrival to Spain, enlarged-EU male migrants are 7 percentage points less likely to work than their native counterparts (once all observable socio-demographics have been accounted for). By contrast, female enlarged-EU migrants are slightly more likely to work than native women, by 2 percentage points.
12
Given the average employment rate for enlarged-EU men (women) of 79 (63) per cent, our estimates imply that enlarged-EU migrants are 9 (3) per cent less (more) likely to work after first arriving than their male (female) counterparts. This situation does not seem to change with time in the country.
The findings for enlarged-EU males differ from those cited within Spanish migration literature. For instance, Fernández and Ortega (2008) find that the labour supply of new male immigrants arriving from Eastern Europe is higher than that of similar natives, and decreases over time. In contrast to this study, the authors use data from an earlier period (1996 to 2005) and do not only focus on enlarged-EU countries.
However, focusing on migrants from the EU-enlargement member states and using only Table 4 show that, upon arrival in Spain, enlarged-EU migrants are 6 percentage points more likely to work than other migrants (once all observable socio-demographics have been accounted for). Moreover, this employment situation improves with time in
Spain.
Enlarged-EU migrants are less likely to work under permanent contracts than natives, although their employment situation in Spain improves with time. Table 5 shows that enlarged-EU migrants are more likely to work under more vulnerable conditions. Upon arrival, male (female) migrants are 39 (15) percentage points less likely to work under permanent contract than their native counterparts. However, this gap narrows over time and takes 12 (5) years for men (women) to vanish, before subsequently reversing.
Enlarged-EU migrants are less likely to be self-employed than natives and other migrants. This difference is larger among males than females. Given that they are high-skilled workers, it may be the case that enlarged-EU migrants are more entrepreneurial than natives or other migrants; however, we find no evidence of this in Table 6 . Upon arrival, enlarged-EU male migrants are 12 and 5 percentage points less likely to be self-employed than natives or other migrants, respectively. Moreover, when compared to natives, this differential does not decrease over time. The same pattern is observed among women; however, the differential between enlarged-EU female migrants and natives or other migrants is considerably smaller than that observed among men.
Enlarged-EU migrants are over-qualified for their jobs, more so than natives and other migrants. A common finding in the case of Spain is that immigrants are much more likely to be over-educated than similar natives (Fernández and Ortega, 2008; Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas, 2009 ). Like these authors, we also find that enlarged-EU migrants are more over-educated than natives and other immigrants (as shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7) . 13 In line with earlier results, we find that overeducation is more concerning for enlarged-EU males than females.
Moreover, we find that the over-education differential between enlarged-EU migrants and natives does not decrease over time, namely there is no convergence.
14 While this result differs from those earlier described on migrants' employment and work security assimilation in Spain, it is consistent with findings from Fernández and Ortega (2008) , which reveal that the over-education gap of male immigrants with comparable natives is unaffected by the number of years since migration. These findings are also in line with Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas (2009) , who find that the degree of assimilation in Spain is higher the lower their education level. These authors find that high-skilled immigrants are over-represented in the "non-qualified" occupation category, which includes jobs such as janitors, entry positions in construction work, non-qualified labourers, house cleaning, child caring and elderly caring.
There is a negative residual welfare gap between enlarged-EU migrants and natives or other migrants. The residual welfare gap is the difference in welfare use between migrants and natives, after having controlled for observable differences across the two groups. The residual welfare gap between enlarged-EU migrants and natives in Spain is a negative 11 percentage points for males and 7 percentage points for females, as shown in column 1 in Table 8 . This negative residual welfare gap upon arrival is consistent with the Rodríguez-Planas (2013), who finds that immigrants in Spain are less likely to participate in cash-benefit social programmes than natives, even when controlling for observable characteristics. 15 The author concludes that the self-selection of immigrants coming to a relatively ungenerous welfare state (at least in terms of means-tested social programmes) is a likely reason for this result.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient in the "years since migration" variable in column 1 of Table 8 is positive and statistically significant. Although this estimate may seem to suggest that enlarged-EU migrants increase their welfare use relative to similar natives over time, when information from column 1 in Table 9 is added it becomes clear that assimilation into welfare is mainly driven by UI benefits. This is consistent with Rodríguez-Planas (2013), who finds that there is no assimilation into cash-welfare benefits in Spain (other than UI benefits). This result contrasts with findings from other countries, and even those with traditionally not very generous states, such as the United States.
When comparing enlarged-EU welfare use to that of other migrants in Spain, we also observe a negative residual welfare gap for males (of 3.3 percentage points), yet not for females (shown in column 2 of Table 8 ).
Enlarged-EU migrants are less likely to receive UI upon arrival than natives, yet this differential decreases over time. Column 1 in Table 9 shows that enlarged-EU migrants are 7 percentage points less likely to receive UI upon arrival in Spain than natives. This result is consistent with the defined benefit pay-as-you-go Spanish social security system, which conditions the receipt and level of unemployment benefits to the worker's labour history (wages and number of years of contribution).
When we compare UI receipt between enlarged-EU migrants and other migrants in Spain, holding all other characteristics constant, we find a considerably smaller difference for males (column 2 in Table 9 ). Among women, enlarged-EU migrants are slightly more likely to receive UI upon arrival than other migrants.
We find that enlarged-EU immigrants assimilate into unemployment benefits with time spent in the new country, and do so at a faster rate than natives (or other migrants). However, the difference in UI receipt between enlarged-EU migrants and natives disappears four and a half years after arriving, and begins to reverse. In contrast, Rodríguez-Planas (2013) finds that it takes between 6 to 8 years in Spain for the difference to vanish when all immigrants (rather than just enlarged-EU) are compared to natives. Since enlarged-EU immigrants concentrate in the most vulnerable positions, they are the first to be hit by recession, and consequently use unemployment benefits as a supplement of income once they have the right to do so. This is a likely part of the explanation for the sustained stock of enlarged-EU immigrants, even after the Great Recession.
Effects of the 2007 Crisis
In this section, we focus on the differential effects between enlarged-EU migrants and natives or other migrants after 2007. In our specification, these effects are measured by the coefficients (α 2 +α 4 ) for males and (α 2 +α 4 +α 6 ) for females. In Spain, access to wage and salary jobs.
After the 2007 crisis, enlarged-EU female migrants' skills downgrading is reduced.
After the 2007 crisis, the over-education differential between enlarged-EU women and natives or other migrants is reduced by 6 and 5 percentage points, respectively.
The negative residual welfare gap between Enlarged-EU migrants and natives or other migrants improves for males and widens for females after the 2007 crisis, reflecting the differential gender effects of the crisis among enlarged-EU migrants.
Interestingly, the negative welfare gap between enlarged-EU migrants and natives or other migrants shrinks considerably among males after the 2007 crisis, yet widens among females. Given that this is mainly driven by the unemployment benefits (shown in Table 9 ), it reflects the relatively worse labour market position for enlarged-EU males and relative labour market improvement for enlarged-EU females after 2007.
Impact of enlarged-EU migrants on the receiving country
The number of enlarged-EU migrants in Spain increased from 23,467 in 2000 to 1,111,676 in 2011, representing 17 per cent of the foreign-born population. Most of the literature on migration finds a small effect (if any) of migration inflows on the labour market prospects (employment and wage) of natives with similar skill levels, which has also been confirmed for the Spanish case (Carrasco et al., 2008) . Consequently, in light of previous evidence, one should not expect any large effects of the enlarged-EU migrants on the labour market outcomes of natives with similar skill levels.
By contrast, recent literature has presented evidence of some complementarities between low-skilled immigrants and high-skilled natives. For the Spanish case, Farré et al. (2011) show that the massive inflow of immigrants during the past decade has had a positive effect on the labour market participation of high-skilled native women. The authors show that female migration has substantially reduced the price of domestic services, with high-skilled women having hired domestic services in response, substituting away hours of home production (childcare and housekeeping) by hours of work in the market. The estimates in Farré et al. (2011) indicate that the large inflow of immigrants to Spain between 1999 and 2008 led to a 3-percentage-point increase in the participation rate of highly skilled women with family responsibilities.
As shown in Table 3 , enlarged-EU female immigrants are disproportionately employed in domestic services; therefore, this group is likely to have contributed to the increase in the labour market participation of native women. The share of enlarged-EU women over the immigrant population increased from almost 2 to more than 16 per cent between 1999 and 2008. According to the estimates of Farré et al. (2011) , this group would have been responsible for around a 0.42-percentage-point increase in native female employment (i.e. 14 per cent of the total increase in native female employment).
How do enlarged-EU migrants affect the Spanish pension, health and education systems? Due to the immigration boom being a relatively recent process in Spain, very few migrants receive old age pensions as they are typically still of working age (Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón, 2009). Indeed, this is particularly true of enlarged-EU migrants, given that they are younger than those from other origins. Moreover, the Spanish Social Security System is a defined benefit pay-as-you-go system whereby the pension level largely depends on the worker's labour history (wages, number of years of contribution and age of retirement). Therefore, even if they were over 65 years old, enlarged-EU migrants would not receive an old age pension unless they contributed the minimum 15 years required by law. Moving now to the effects of enlarged-EU migrants on the health care system, Muñoz de Bustillo and Antón (2009) 
V. Conclusion: Lessons Learn
The Spanish economy has suffered a major reverse since the great recession, with the burst of the real-estate bubble, a failing banking system, a lack of liquidity and loans for firms and a rigid labour market having driven the economy to a double recession within four years. The change of government at the end of 2011 has shifted the social welfare priorities, changing the regulation so that universal health care is no longer readily available to legal and illegal immigrants. Consequently, the inflow of immigrants has come to a halt, while the soaring unemployment rate is pushing both immigrants and natives to leave the country, as the employment perspective becomes meagre.
How have enlarged-EU immigrants coped with the soaring job destruction rates observed in Spain? Our analysis reveals that the employment and welfare situation of enlarged-EU migrants after 2007 crucially depends on their gender. For instance, enlarged-EU males are the big losers, given that their employment situation worsens and their job precariousness increases. Unsurprisingly given the worsening of their labour market, they are relatively more likely to receive UI than pre-2008 (although their UI intake is still lower than that of natives and other migrants), and they are also relatively more likely to be self-employed (albeit their relative level is still below that of natives and other migrants). By contrast, post-2007 enlarged-EU female migrants are relatively better off regarding all such dimensions vis-à-vis natives and other migrants.
Clearly, occupation gender segregation must be behind possible explanations for these findings. Since enlarged-EU male migrants were working disproportionately more in construction jobs than other migrants (31 per cent versus 17 per cent), they are those most hit by the real-state burst. By contrast, given that enlarged-EU females are disproportionately in domestic services jobs (35 per cent versus 25 per cent), they are the ones who have suffered less from the recession. There are at least two reasons for this delayed effect of the crisis on domestic services jobs: first, as the real-state bubble burst, male dominated sectors were immediately hard hit; and second, since many males (regardless of their country of origin) were losing jobs in Spain, their spouses (especially the native ones who had a relatively low labour force participation) reconsidered their labour market choices and entered employment, by doing so increasing the demand for domestic services, at least in the short-run. Nonetheless, as this crisis keeps on shredding jobs it is most likely a matter of time before even female workers in the domestic sector eventually feel the consequences of the downturn.
However, the long-term labour market prospects of immigrants in Spain are not that pessimistic. On the one hand, the Spanish population is rapidly aging, which will tend to increase the demand for elderly care, and immigrants, and particularly women, will find jobs in the domestic sector. On the other hand, if the economic recession exacerbates the Spanish brain drain, there may be a shortage of highly educated workers (i.e. engineers) in some years. Consequently, if wages do not recover sufficiently to bring back native workers, there may be a market for high skilled immigrants. 
